Nevertheless, as arbitration matured, the Court reconsidered this position. 4 Declaring that arbitration did not necessarily affect substantive rights, the Court replaced the bright-line non-arbitrability rule with a fact-specific test that allows plaintiffs to go to court if they prove that they cannot vindicate their federal statutory rights in arbitration. 5 This "vindication of rights" rule-the ghost of the non-arbitrability doctrine-has recently become more important. For one, the Court has nearly concluded its slow march toward universal arbitrability. 6 Even decades after the Court switched to the vindication of rights approach, pockets of the non-arbitrability doctrine remained. 7 For instance, judges refused to grant preclusive effect to an arbitrator's resolution of civil rights claims if an arbitration clause appeared in a collective bargaining agreement (as opposed to an individualized employment contract).
8 But in its 2009 decision 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, the Court abolished that exception. 9 As a result, the vindication of rights defense-and not the non-arbitrability doctrine-will be the sole limit on the arbitrability of statutory claims in most contexts. 10 At the same time, the unconscionability doctrine, a related check on drafter overreaching, has come under fire. 
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invoke either the vindication of rights rule (a creature of federal common law) or the unconscionability defense (a principle of state contract law) to invalidate one-sided arbitration clauses.
12
This symmetry arose because one prong of the unconscionability inquiry-substantive unconscionability-centers on the fairness of a specific contractual term. 13 As a result, if a plaintiff proved that some aspect of an adhesive arbitration clause thwarted her federal statutory rights, then a judge could find that the clause was unconscionable, violated the vindication of rights doctrine, or both.
14 The Court's 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion has forced lower courts to untangle the two rules. 15 Concepcion held that the FAA preempted a California Supreme Court opinion that deemed most class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts to be unconscionable. 16 Yet because the vindication of rights doctrine is a matter of federal law, the FAA cannot preempt it. Thus, after Concepcion, the court in Kate's hypothetical case cannot annul the class arbitration waiver on unconscionability grounds, 17 but it may be able to do so under the vindication of rights rule. For example, Kate could try to persuade the judge that she cannot exercise her federal statutory rights without the class action mechanism, either because she seeks to aggregate many "negative value" claims (where the litigation costs 12. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 63 (1st Cir. 2006) (describing how plaintiffs' claims can be analyzed using either approach). "As a practical matter, there are striking similarities between the vindication of statutory rights analysis and the unconscionability analysis." Id.
13. See A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122-23 (Ct. App. 1982) (discussing, in part, California's substantive unconscionability jurisprudence).
14. See Kristian, 446 F.3d at 29, 63 (finding several arbitration provisions prevented the vindication of plaintiffs' federal statutory rights and discussing the two methods of analysis).
15 I will call this idea-that parties cannot prospectively waive public law claims-the "statutory waiver rule." The non-arbitrability doctrine once implemented the statutory waiver rule by nullifying all pre-dispute contracts to arbitrate statutory claims. 22 Today, the vindication of rights doctrine inverts that approach by requiring forceful proof that a plaintiff cannot effectively prosecute her statutory cause of action in arbitration. 23 But like the nonarbitrability doctrine, the vindication of rights rule is simply the tool that courts use to enforce the statutory waiver rule: it invalidates arbitration provisions that are the functional equivalent of express waivers of federal statutory rights. 24 But what explains the statutory waiver rule? The answer to that question has never been clear. For instance, some federal statutes contain express anti-waiver provisions. 25 The statutory waiver rule, 20. For an early attempt to make sense of the Court's non-arbitrability jurisprudence, see Edward M. Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1077 (1987) (arguing that statutory claims should not be arbitrable if they seek to vindicate "social end [s] extrinsic to the parties' direct relationship," such as policies in favor of competitive markets and, presumably, anti-discrimination principles). As noted above, however, the Court has obliterated this distinction and has compelled arbitration of claims under statutes that "further important social policies." Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991 (1985) (noting that when "choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, [the Court] would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy").
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2006) (Securities Act anti-waiver provision); id. § 77cc(a) (Securities Exchange Act anti-waiver provision).
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however, applies not just to these laws-which Congress has shielded from market forces-but to all federal legislation. 26 Similarly, it is not immediately apparent why lawmakers would wish to forbid parties with equal bargaining power from contracting around intrusive, cumbersome regulation. Finally, there is a plausible argument that one-sided arbitration clauses are efficient. In a competitive market, drafters must pass their litigation and liability savings back to adherents. In turn, consumers and employees might prefer to have extra money in their pockets rather than retain their ability to sue for violation of the public laws.
27 Thus, the statutory waiver rule's normative foundation remains poorly understood.
This uncertainty has radiated out into the case law. Even putting aside the nascent class action issue, circuits disagree over how to implement the vindication of rights doctrine. For example, some jurisdictions annul cost-splitting clauses if they make arbitration prohibitively expensive for a specific plaintiff, 28 while others step back and consider the effect on other, similarly situated litigants. 29 Courts are also divided about the validity of pay-your-own-way and loser-pays provisions, as well as how to treat after-the-fact efforts by defendants to cure prohibitive arbitral costs by offering to reimburse the plaintiff.
30
More generally, the Seventh Circuit has hinted that it does not recognize the statutory waiver rule, opining that "the Supreme Court has never held that any entitlement is outside the domain of contract." 34 or the need to comply with civic duties such as jury service or the military draft.
35
These limits on freedom of contract are controversial. 36 Yet courts and scholars have defended them on several grounds. For instance, inalienability can prevent market failures that would result from poor information or negative externalities.
37
In addition, it can serve as a bulwark against the commodification of cherished objects or entitlements.
I draw on these rationales to bolster the statutory waiver rule and to propose several changes to the vindication of rights doctrine. First, I argue that even if one-sided arbitration clauses lower prices and raise wages, they are not necessarily socially beneficial. Not all rights are commensurate with money: we value certain entitlements, such as freedom from discrimination, differently than we value cash. Because these two things cannot be compared along a common metric, an adherent who surrenders her anti-discrimination rights for an increased salary is not truly "better off."
38 As a result, I propose that courts relax the vindication of rights burden for anti-discrimination claimants.
Second, I contend that, in some contexts, the statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine prevent negative externalities.
39
For example, prospective waivers of antitrust and securities claims harm the public by undermining markets and causing the misallocation of capital. In addition, allowing defendants to salvage an otherwise invalid arbitration clause by paying a specific plaintiff's arbitral costs affects third parties: it deters future litigants who will be subject to the same harsh terms. At the same time, though, I show how mass contracting creates unique problems about what counts as an "externality."
Finally, I evaluate the federal law of arbitrability through the lens of At first blush, non-commodification analysis, which we normally associate with intensely personal objects or entitlements, seems to have little bearing on the pre-dispute inalienability of federal statutory rights. Upon closer inspection, however, the statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine can be seen as preserving the distinctive qualities of congressional lawmaking-its pedigree and expressive function-in an era where private parties exercise legislative-like power. By creating a safe harbor for Congress's handiwork, these principles maintain a necessary division between private and public law. I argue that courts can further this goal by being skeptical of pay-your-own-way and loser-pays provisions: one-sided clauses that serve no arbitration-related purpose and thus are bald attempts to rewrite the underlying statutory scheme.
41
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II traces the development of the non-arbitrability doctrine and the vindication of rights rule. It reveals that confusion about the statutory waiver rule-the premise that animates both approaches-has made it difficult for judges to apply these principles. Part III uses justifications for inalienability in other contexts to illuminate the statutory waiver rule and propose several changes to the vindication of rights doctrine.
II. FROM NON-ARBITRABILITY TO VINDICATION OF RIGHTS
In this Part, I describe the intersection of the FAA and other federal statutes. I begin with the non-arbitrability doctrine: courts' initial kneejerk assumption that arbitration was incompatible with federal statutory rights. I trace how this jaundiced view evolved into the vindication of 40. See discussion infra Part III.C. 41. A perceptive reader will notice that most of the justifications I offer for the rules that safeguard against prospective waiver of federal statutory rights apply with equal force to state legislation. Yet it seems unlikely that courts will nullify arbitration clauses on the grounds that they prevent a plaintiff from effectively pursuing state statutory claims. After all, under the Supremacy Clause, the FAA-federal substantive law-overrides any conflicting state policy. See Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat'l Ass'n, 2012 WL 718344, at *13 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2012) (finding that the FAA preempted a California common law rule that excluded public injunction claims from arbitration because "[t]he FAA is 'the supreme law of the land'" (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI)); see also rights doctrine, which requires plaintiffs to marshal concrete proof that they cannot effectively prosecute congressionally created rights in arbitration. I reveal that these two principles are actually drastically different ways of trying to achieve the same objective: barring parties from contracting away their ability to sue for future statutory violations. I then show how uncertainty about the policy basis of this premise has led to disagreement over the contours of the vindication of rights doctrine.
A. Non-Arbitrability
The non-arbitrability doctrine first appeared in the Court's 1953 decision Wilko v. Swan. 42 In that case, the Court refused to compel arbitration of an alleged violation of the Securities Act of 1933. 43 The Securities Act contains two unique components: section 22 gives plaintiffs broad discretion to choose a venue and forum, 44 and section 14 invalidates "[a]ny condition, stipulation, or provision . . . waiv [ing] compliance with any provision of this subchapter." 45 The Court determined that because the arbitration clause at issue overrode the courtselection rights bestowed by section 22, it was an impermissible waiver under section 14. 46 Nevertheless, on the general issue of the permissibility of arbitrating statutory claims, Wilko appeared to be at war with itself. At one point, the opinion acknowledged that the FAA serves the salutary purpose of "avoiding the delay and expense of litigation," and may be "useful[] . . . in controversies based on statutes." 47 But later, the Court implied that the informality of arbitration dilutes the potency of the statutory scheme. 48 According to the Court, because arbitrators lack legal training and need not memorialize their decisions in writing, the "effectiveness" of the Securities Act "is lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings." A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter. The Sherman Act is designed to promote the national interest in a competitive economy; thus, the plaintiff asserting his rights under the Act has been likened to a private attorney-general who protects the public's interest.
Antitrust violations can affect hundreds of thousands-perhaps millions-of people and inflict staggering economic damage.
53
In addition, these judges reasoned that Congress could not have meant to entrust antitrust issues to arbitrators, who often worked in the business world-the very community the Sherman Act regulates. 54 Yet these concerns-the public interest in the enforcement of statutes and the specter of arbitral bias or incompetence-have no limiting principle. Indeed, all federal regulation can be seen as serving vital societal functions, and the risk that it might be interpreted by an unworthy arbitrator is a hypothesis that cannot be falsified. Courts thus applied the non-arbitrability doctrine to a wide range of other laws. They invalidated pre-dispute contracts to arbitrate claims under the Patent Act, 55 Paradoxically, many of these same courts upheld contracts to arbitrate existing statutory claims, which they conceptualized as a species of settlement agreement. 61 They did not attempt to square this approach with the reasoning behind the blanket ban they had imposed on pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate federal statutory claims; 62 indeed, it seemed unlikely that the mere fact a dispute had arisen diminished the need for prosecution of the public laws or made arbitrators more capable.
These decisions also suffered from a second flaw: they created confusion about the relationship between the non-arbitrability doctrine and congressional intent. For one, it was hard to square the reflexive non-arbitrability rule that courts had created with the fact that the FAA's text does not categorically exempt federal statutory claims. Moreover, like the Securities Act at issue in Wilko, some federal laws contain express non-waiver provisions. 63 But widespread application of the non- e conclude that concerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement . . . ." (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974))).
its previous holdings, the Court implied that arbitration was, in fact, outcome-neutral:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration. At the same time, the Court clarified that it was not abolishing the statutory waiver rule, reasoning that if the arbitration clause acted "as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies . . . we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy." 72 Thus, although the Court paved the way for the arbitration of federal statutory claims, it declined to give companies carte blanche to rewrite the public laws through one-sided arbitration clauses.
In 1991, the Court continued to retreat from the non-arbitrability doctrine in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. by compelling arbitration of a claim for wrongful firing under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 73 Although the Court acknowledged that the ADEA furthered important policies, it opined that the statute would "'continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function'" as long as litigants could "'vindicate [their] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.'" 74 In a preview of the issues that would later arise under the vindication of rights doctrine, the Court then explained why the plaintiff would be able to pursue his claim adequately. The Court noted that the New York Stock Exchange arbitral rules, which would govern the dispute, "provide 77 Larketta Randolph financed the purchase of a mobile home through Green Tree.
78
Her loan contained a clause that mandated arbitration but said nothing about how the proceeding was to be conducted. 79 She then filed a class action against Green Tree under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). 80 When Green Tree moved to compel arbitration, Randolph argued that she lacked the resources to arbitrate her claims, citing evidence that "arbitration filing fees for claims below $10,000 were generally $500 and that the average arbitrator's fee per day is $700."
81
The district court ordered the matter to arbitration, 82 but the Eleventh Circuit reversed. 83 The appellate court was troubled by the arbitration clause's silence:
The arbitration clause in this case raises serious concerns with respect to filing fees, arbitrators' costs and other arbitration expenses that may curtail or bar a plaintiff's access to the arbitral forum . . . . This clause says nothing about the payment of filing fees or the apportionment of the costs of arbitration. It neither assigns an initial responsibility for filing fees or arbitrators' costs, nor provides for a waiver in cases of financial hardship. It does not say whether consumers, if they prevail, will nonetheless be saddled with fees and costs in excess of any award.
84
The Supreme Court reversed. 85 It had no quarrel with the general proposition that heavy arbitral costs could serve as the basis for annulling an arbitration clause. 86 The Court, however, determined that Randolph's In a critical passage, the Court demanded more of plaintiffs with vindication of rights allegations, declaring that "[t]he 'risk' that Randolph will be saddled with prohibitive costs is too speculative to justify the invalidation of an arbitration agreement." 88 After Green Tree, jurisdictions have disagreed about how to assess vindication of rights challenges. One common problem is cost-splitting provisions, which usually require plaintiffs to pay half of the arbitral expenses. In Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Systems, Inc., the Fourth Circuit considered the propriety of such a clause. 89 The court read Green Tree to "suggest[] that some showing of individualized prohibitive expense . . . [is] necessary to invalidate an arbitration agreement."
90
As a result, the court adopted a test that probes the plaintiff's financial resources-her income, net worth, checking account balance, investments, debts, and other obligations-and then considers whether the added cost of arbitration (as compared to litigation) will deter her.
91
Bradford's plaintiff-specific approach has been influential in other circuits. 92 Yet some courts interpret Bradford as erecting a virtually insurmountable bar to vindication of rights claims. Justice Scalia echoed the Green Tree Court's rhetoric about not making assumptions as to what would occur in arbitration, reasoning that "'mere speculation' that an arbitrator might interpret these ambiguous agreements in a manner that casts their enforceability into doubt" was insufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a judicial forum. 93 In the district court's own words, she proved that (i) she is currently unemployed and does not receive income; (ii) her husband's income is roughly $l,500-$2,000 per month after taxes; (iii) her monthly expenses-which include a $1,807.32 monthly mortgage payment and a $498.75 monthly condominium fee-total approximately $3325; (iv) she and her husband have minimal funds in their bank accounts and 401(k) plans, and they currently possess negligible, if any, equity in their condominium; (v) she and her husband are without medical insurance; (vi) she and her husband have one minor child, currently are expecting another, and provide economic support to her husband's family in the Republic of Georgia; and (vii) neither plaintiff, nor her husband, have sufficient property to serve as collateral to obtain a loan to advance arbitration costs. 94 Nevertheless, citing the plaintiff's educational background and employment history, the court held that she had not proven that "she is unable to earn sufficient income to advance arbitration costs; rather, she has merely established that she currently does not earn such income."
95
Other courts view the vindication of rights inquiry more broadly. In Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., the Sixth Circuit criticized Bradford's laser-like focus on individual plaintiffs. 96 Morrison noted that although Bradford's approach might provide remedies for aggrieved parties in particular cases, it did not do enough to discourage statutory violations in the first instance. 97 To ensure that public laws continue to prevent wrongdoing, Morrison held that judges must evaluate not only whether arbitral costs would thwart this particular plaintiff's claims, "but also whether other similarly situated individuals would be deterred . . Morrison invalidated a cost-splitting provision based on nothing more than the fact a plaintiff "was employed . . . as a mechanic and as a salesperson" and would need to deposit over $1000 with the arbitrator before the hearing. 99 Another contentious vindication of rights issue revolves around attorneys' fees. Arbitration clauses sometimes require each party to pay their own legal bills. 104 The court questioned the soundness of the statutory waiver rule:
As far as we know, the Supreme Court has never held that any entitlement is outside the domain of contract, unless the statute forbids waiver . . . . One aspect of personal liberty is the entitlement to exchange statutory rights for something valued more highly. Instead of offering a benefit only to a person who is required to arbitrate or litigate, a fee-shifting statute may provide a benefit more widely to the extent that it changes the terms of trade; the customer sells the [A]t this point Plaintiff has not been assessed with any fees, nor is it certain that he ever will be. Given these facts, we cannot conclude that the arbitration agreement constitutes a barrier to vindication of Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff's speculation about prohibitive costs is just that-speculation; this is not enough to invalidate an otherwise enforceable arbitration provision. Similarly, in Faber, the Eighth Circuit enforced a provision that required each party to bear its own attorneys' fees against an ADEA claimant, tersely concluding that it was neither "substantively unfair" nor "inimical to the public good." 367 F.3d at 1055.
106 concern: allowing a defendant to ignore the plain language of its own contract would give it the power to unilaterally amend the arbitration agreement.
113
Nevertheless, in 2009, in Mazera v. Varsity Ford Management Services, different Sixth Circuit judges enforced an arbitration clause-despite finding it "prohibitively expensive"-simply because the defendant stated that it "might" waive the requirement that the plaintiff pay a $500 deposit.
114
On the flipside of the same issue, it is unclear how other avenues of plaintiff funding affect the vindication of rights analysis. For instance, in an insightful article, Christopher Drahozal notes that federal statutory claimants are often represented by contingency fee lawyers.
115 Drahozal argues that because these attorneys usually advance litigation expenses, they might cover arbitration costs as well. 116 In turn, if many plaintiffs do not pay up-front arbitral fees, then their individual financescurrently the centerpiece of cost-based vindication of rights challengeswould be far less probative of whether arbitration deters claims. 117 In fact, as Drahozal notes, the vindication of rights doctrine creates perverse incentives for the arbitration-phobic plaintiffs' bar: "[s]o long as attorneys can use the upfront costs of arbitration as a ground for challenging an arbitration agreement (enabling their client to bring his or her claim in court instead of in arbitration), attorneys have an incentive not to finance arbitration costs."
118 Ironically, however, courts generally use contingent representation as a one-way ratchet in the opposite 113. 367 F.3d 493, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2004) ("MRM's offer was an impermissible attempt to vary the terms of a contract. There was neither a meeting of the minds nor consideration to support such a post hoc unilateral amendment of the agreement.").
114. See 565 F.3d 997, 1004-05 (6th Cir. 2009). This ruling was all the more striking because the court did not conclusively determine that the defendant would waive the fee; rather, it only "suspect[ed]" that the defendant would "seriously entertain [the plaintiff's] waiver request." Id. at 1005 (noting also that the defendant's "counsel stated at oral argument that, although he could not predict with certainty how his client would respond to a waiver request, he thought it likely that such a request would be granted"). ("Arbitration costs are simply another form of expense-like discovery costs, investigation costs, expert witness fees, and so on. Given that lawyers are willing to finance and insure against these other sorts of expenses, one would expect the same to be true for arbitration costs.").
117. Arguably, however, a plaintiff's finances might still be relevant; contingency-fee lawyers may be less likely to advance arbitral costs if they suspect that unsuccessful plaintiffs will not be able to reimburse them.
118. Drahozal, supra note 115, at 735.
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direction: they only mention a plaintiff's inability to obtain counsel as a reason to invalidate an arbitration clause.
119
This link between arbitration and the market for legal representation looms especially large for the final (and arguably most important) vindication of rights issue-the class arbitration waiver. For roughly two decades, companies have tried to use arbitration as a shield for class action liability.
120 By placing a class action waiver in an arbitration clause, they sought to endow it with the vigorous policy in favor of arbitration. because these claims will either be prosecuted on a class basis or not at all, class arbitration waivers permit drafters to avoid liability. 123 In two recent blockbuster decisions, however, the U.S. Supreme Court undercut this logic. First, in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., the Court held that class arbitration was improper when an arbitration clause was "silent" on the permissibility of such a procedure. 124 Second, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court held that the FAA preempts Discover Bank. 125 The Court reasoned that the California Supreme Court had used the unconscionability doctrine to require drafters to engage in class arbitration, making "the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment." Although Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion were seen as "the death knell" for class actions, 128 they may not apply so broadly. Discover Bank and its allied cases invoked contract principles that, like all state law, must yield when in conflict with the FAA. But if a plaintiff asserts federal statutory claims, the core insight of these opinions-that class arbitration waivers make certain lawsuits unmarketable-can be recast as a vindication of rights challenge. Indeed, before Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, some courts nullified class arbitration waivers when applied to negative-value federal statutory claims on the grounds that "no attorney (regardless of competence) would ever take such a case on a contingent fee basis."
129 Because the vindication of rights doctrine arises from federal common law-and is thus immune from FAA preemption-Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion's impact on these cases remains hazy. On the one hand, as noted above, the vindication of rights doctrine is, at bottom, an attempt to square the FAA with other federal laws. 130 As some defendants have argued, the Court sometimes favors a statute with a broad preemptive ambit over other, "lesser" statutes. 131 Thus, by expanding the domain of the FAA, Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion may have implicitly undercut the vindication of rights doctrine.
132 Indeed, as one district court put it, thanks to Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion, there is now "considerable uncertainty surrounding the precise metes and bounds of the federal common law of arbitrability." 133 In the Amex litigation, however, the Second Circuit determined that judges may still invalidate class arbitration waivers under the vindication of rights doctrine. 134 In 2009, the appellate court invalidated a class arbitration waiver on the grounds that a class of medium-sized merchants would not be able to vindicate their complex and expensive antitrust claims against American Express on an individual basis. 135 In 2010, the Supreme Court decided Stolt-Nielsen and subsequently remanded the Amex litigation for further consideration. Undeterred, in 2011, the Second Circuit held that the vindication of rights doctrine had survived:
Stolt-Nielsen states that parties cannot be forced to engage in a class arbitration absent a contractual agreement to do so. It does not follow, as Amex urges, that a contractual clause barring class arbitration is per se enforceable. Indeed, our prior holding focused not on whether the F.3d 25, 58 (1st Cir. 2006) (finding that class arbitration waiver impaired plaintiffs' ability to bring antitrust claims where expert fees would costs hundreds of thousands of dollars, but each plaintiff's recovery "will range from a few hundred dollars to a few thousand dollars at most"); cf. 137 Thus, it appears that the vindication of rights doctrine has supplanted unconscionability as the primary means for courts to strike down class arbitration waivers.
138
In sum, courts once exempted all federal statutory claims from the FAA's ambit; now, they compel arbitration of those claims unless a plaintiff proves that doing so will thwart her rights. The now-obsolete non-arbitrability rule and its predecessor, the vindication of rights doctrine, serve a common goal: preventing parties from prospectively relinquishing congressionally given rights. In turn, the policy basis of this objective has always been elusive. As a result, courts have implemented the vindication of rights doctrine inconsistently. In the next Part, I draw on inalienability theory to flesh out the statutory waiver rule and recalibrate the vindication of rights doctrine. 138. Then again, as this Article was going to press, the Missouri Supreme Court nullified a class arbitration waiver by finding that the entire arbitration clause in which it appeared was "extremely one-sided" and thus unconscionable. The statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine are anomalies. In a society committed to the notion that unfettered exchange will shepherd an asset to its best use, inalienability is an "analytic stepchild"-an "obviously inefficient constraint[] on market trades." 139 Nevertheless, economists concede that inalienability can prevent market failure caused by imperfect information, avoid negative externalities, and encourage positive externalities.
140
In addition, a rich noninstrumentalist literature has argued that inalienability is necessary to prevent the commodification of certain sacred things. In this Part, I bring these perspectives to bear on the statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine.
A. Imperfect Information
Inalienability can prevent market failure that would otherwise occur because of informational defects. 141 Indeed, the main utilitarian justification for enforcing promises-that parties know which deals will make them better off-does not apply if one party lacks the knowledge necessary to make such an assessment.
142
Of course, no one ever possesses perfect information, 143 and most misunderstandings do not warrant state intervention. 144 Nevertheless, because informational flaws are a well-accepted source of market failure, commentators sometimes cite them as reason to adopt an inalienability rule.
145
For example, 139. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 35, at 931; see Radin, supra note 33, at 1851 (noting the commonly held view that "inalienable property rights are exceptional and problematic").
140. See Radin, supra note 33, at 1863 (stating that "inalienability is a means of controlling externalities that prevent the market from achieving an efficient result").
141. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 35, at 939 (stating that because "markets also frequently work poorly because information is imperfect," market failure due to informational defects provides a rationale for inalienability rules").
142. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 102-03 (1993) (noting that "if at least one party inaccurately perceives or evaluates the impact of the exchange on her utility, we can no longer be confident that [it] will in fact render both parties better off").
143. See id. at 103 (stating that "[a]lmost no exchanges are entered into with absolutely perfect information by both parties").
144. See id. ("Even the purchase of the morning newspaper . . . on the assumption that it will contain an interesting film or restaurant review, when this assumption turns out to be false, reflects an exchange entered into with incomplete information.").
145. consumer, employment, and landlord-tenant law is littered with nondisclaimable rights and duties, from usury laws to warranties of habitability. 146 These rules protect vulnerable parties from harsh terms that they likely do not understand.
The statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine may serve a similar purpose. After all, because of the widespread belief that adherents ignore dispute resolution terms in standard form contracts, there has been a long debate among legal academics about informational asymmetries and arbitration. 147 For instance, in a groundbreaking critique of the Court's FAA jurisprudence, David Schwartz claims that the statutory waiver rule levels the informational playing field between drafters and adherents. 148 When a party to a contract waives her rights to recover for future harm, particularly when this waiver is unilateral (as it typically is), strong reason exists to believe that some combination of unequal bargaining power and information underlies the agreement. In certain common adhesion contract situations, the weaker or adhering party is likely to be relatively uninformed about the likelihood or degree of potential harm for which she is waiving future remedies, and to underestimate the value of the rights forfeited.
149
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111 (1972) (citing instances where external costs, such as freeloader and informational costs, make limitations on the ability to engage in transactions more efficient); Rose-Ackerman, supra note 35, at 946-47 (stating that modified inalienability could be a response to quality control problems created by markets with imperfect information).
146 Although Schwartz was writing before the emergence of the vindication of rights doctrine, his argument applies with greater force to that arbitration-specific principle. The statutory waiver rule governs express waivers of public law rights. 150 If a party cannot appreciate the gravity of such a clause, then she is even less likely to understand the effect of a one-sided arbitration provision that implicitly achieves the same result. Arguably, then, there are reasons to be especially concerned about informational defects at the crossroads of public law and arbitration.
Law and economics aficionados, however, have not been persuaded. Even if consumers and employees systemically undervalue their federal statutory rights, it does not necessarily follow that the market for these rights will malfunction.
151
Assume that an elite group of adherents actively seeks optimal terms: either "fair" arbitration clauses or "unfair" provisions that are accompanied by price reductions or higher wages. In a competitive market, drafters will need to cater to these "shoppers" to stay in business.
152 But because drafters cannot distinguish shoppers from the masses, they must offer one set of terms for all their customers. As a result, if shoppers' preferences are majoritarian-if they dovetail with what most consumers and employees want-then drafters will offer efficient arbitration clauses.
153
Now suppose that the informational critique of arbitration is exactly right: nobody reads the fine print, or searches for ideal arbitration clauses, or is even capable of detecting a link between a harsh provision and other, more-favorable terms. The market will push drafters in one direction: they will offer unfair arbitration clauses along with lower prices and higher wages.
154 After all, if adherents ignore dispute resolution terms, then they undoubtedly (arguing that adherents overlook the significance of "waiv[ing] rights that will become operative only upon the occurrence of a future event that is remote, uncertain, and often undesirable").
150. This will hold true no matter whether adherents "understand, or even notice, the arbitration clause"; 156 indeed, it follows from the simple fact that "whatever lowers costs to businesses tends over time to lower prices" and raise wages.
157 Now, admittedly, we cannot be sure that this outcome is efficient: whether most adherents actually prefer fair terms or unfair terms with lower prices and higher wages is probably an unanswerable empirical question. Then again, if policymakers must guess, the idea that fully informed consumers and employees would rather have money in their pocket than retain the full rainbow of federal statutory rights seems plausible.
In addition, even for those who are less sanguine about the free market, there is another problem with linking the statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine to informational flaws: the unconscionability doctrine does a better job at covering this terrain. To be sure, the federal law of arbitrability and unconscionability will always overlap. As noted above, the fact that a one-sided arbitration clause dilutes the plaintiff's rights can serve as the springboard for either a vindication of rights or an unconscionability challenge. 158 Technically, however, unconscionability is a superior tool for smoking out informational flaws. Indeed, the test for procedural unconscionability hinges on "overwhelming bargaining strength or use of fine print or incomprehensible legalese" 159 and, thus, isolates terms that adherents are likely to ignore or misunderstand. Conversely, the statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine govern all parties (even corporations) and all contracts (including negotiated deals).
For example, the Court first endorsed the statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., a dispute between two companies. 160 And as noted above, in the Amex litigation, the Second Circuit allowed a group 
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of medium-sized businesses to prove that they could not vindicate their antitrust rights without the class action device. 161 The court took pains to point out that it "in no way rel[ied] on the status of plaintiffs as 'small' merchants." 162 Of course, even these examples-like many business-tobusiness transactions-can take the form of preprinted agreements foisted by a more "powerful" party upon another. 163 Yet outside of the consumer and employment settings, courts are much less concerned about informational defects and generally invalidate provisions only for outright fraud, duress, or mistake. 164 Despite all this, there is a narrow way in which the statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine dovetail with informationbased theories of inalienability. Suppose the law and economic critique of standard form contracts is exactly right. It simply establishes that onesided arbitration provisions save adherents money. But not all rights are commensurate with cash. As Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed note in their celebrated article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, some entitlements simply "do not lend themselves to collective measurement which is acceptably objective and nonarbitrary."
165 This is a broader kind of information problem: it is not that the hustle of the contracting process prevents If Taney is allowed to sell himself into slavery, or to take undue risks of becoming penniless, or to sell a kidney, Marshall may be harmed, simply because Marshall is a sensitive man who is made unhappy by seeing slaves, paupers, or persons who die because they have sold a kidney. Id. at 1112. I discuss negative externalities in Part III.B. Yet the incommensurability of certain rights is not limited to the context of negative externalities; rather, it can undermine our confidence that the contracting parties will enter into deals that will actually make them better off. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
parties from properly valuing their rights, but that certain rights cannot be properly valued under any circumstances. For instance, the victim of a debilitating tort might recover damages, but she can never truly be compensated for her injuries. Bodily integrity is not fungible; it cannot be neatly packaged, weighed, and priced. 166 Similarly, consider workplace discrimination. Most people could probably name a sum for which they would agree to permit their employer to punish them for their immutable characteristics. It is tempting to think that such an exchange would improve their wealth, utility, or happiness. Yet that conclusion ignores the singularity of what it means to be treated with dignity. We value freedom from bias differently than we value cash. 167 Because these two things cannot be reduced to a common metric and compared, it is not entirely accurate to say the transaction makes one better off, worse off, or the same. 168 The incommensurability critique reveals a simple way that courts could improve the vindication of rights doctrine: by linking the intensity of judicial review to the specific federal statute at issue. Currently, when courts decide whether an arbitration clause thwarts a plaintiff's rights, they apply a single, fixed standard that does not fluctuate with the nature of the plaintiff's claim. For instance, as discussed above, many jurisdictions require plaintiffs to introduce concrete, compelling evidence that they are priced out of arbitration-no matter whether the plaintiff alleges violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) or Title VII. 169 This one-size-fits-all approach glosses over the fact that TILA and Title VII serve fundamentally different purposes: the former protects against financial loss while the latter safeguards civil rights that are
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ARBITRATION AND INALIENABILITY 753 incommensurable with money. 170 It makes sense to conclude that most plaintiffs would prefer to have extra cash up front than retain their TILA rights. But as I have argued, it does not follow that anyone is better off when they earn more but suffer discrimination. Relaxing the vindication of rights burden for anti-discrimination plaintiffs-requiring less proof that arbitration thwarts their rights-could accommodate this concern.
In sum, courts often employ the vindication of rights doctrine in situations that involve information imbalances. Yet in this context-onesided arbitration clauses in consumer, franchise, and employment contracts-the vindication of rights doctrine adds nothing to the unconscionability defense. Moreover, because the vindication of rights doctrine also governs brokered deals between relative equals, it does not seem like a response to imperfect information. 171 Nevertheless, I have argued that the rule can be justified on the grounds that some federal statutes protect rights that are incommensurable with money. I now consider a related possibility: that the doctrine is animated by the need to prohibit negative externalities or encourage positive externalities.
B. Externalities
Inalienability can also prevent negative externalities (costs imposed by the transacting parties on third parties) or facilitate positive externalities (benefits conferred by the contracting parties on third parties). 172 In this Part, I argue that prospective waivers of some federal statutory rights cause negative externalities. Yet I also show that the relationship between federal arbitrability principles and externalities is more complex than some courts and scholars have assumed.
To understand the concept of negative externalities, consider a simple example: a landowner is deciding whether to sell a parcel in a residential area to a notorious polluter who intends to build a factory on the site. 173 Even if the polluter is the high bidder, this may not be an efficient result. For instance, the detriment to the neighbors may outweigh the value of the transaction to the putative contractors. As a result, the neighbors have incentives to band together and offer a higher price than the polluter. Yet this result depends on collective action, which is unlikely. Without a way to prevent free-riding, not every affected neighbor will pitch in. Thus, the only way to achieve the best result may be to restrict the way the land can be sold or exploited.
174
Long before arbitration became pervasive, courts purported to apply the statutory waiver rule to avoid negative externalities (although they did not use the phrase "negative externalities"). For instance, in Fox Midwest Theatres v. Means, decided in 1955, the Eighth Circuit held that a settlement agreement could not absolve film producers from liability for future antitrust violations.
175
Because antitrust laws are vital to preserving competitive markets, the court reasoned that such a release "would have impact, not simply between the parties, but upon the public as well." 177 By seeking to prevent harm to parties outside of the contractual relationship, these courts attempted to avoid negative externalities.
Likewise, judges and scholars sometimes link the vindication of rights doctrine to negative externalities. For instance, David Schwartz has argued that robust judicial review of one-sided arbitration provisions prevents "harm to persons affected by, but not party to, the contract." . But see id. at 596 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("Private bargains are subject to attack if enforcement would do too much damage to the statutory system, but this is rare and not a ground to refuse to enforce contracts generally . . . . Contracts rarely defeat the function of the statute so utterly that they may be set aside.").
178. Schwartz, supra note 147, at 114.
functional equivalent of waivers of statutory rights would lead to a kind of private race to the bottom.
179
Because employment agreements, for example, are patterned and repetitive, a prospective waiver provision in an employment contract will not be an isolated event between an employer and a single employee, but will tend to be standardized. If employers presented prospective waivers of Title VII rights as part of "take it or leave it" agreements and turned away prospective employees who refused to sign the provision on the assumption that they could always find someone else who will sign, then the price of discrimination decreases. This occurs because prospective employees, in effect, "underbid" competing job applicants when they willingly devalue their right to statutory protection from discrimination. 180 Similarly, recall that in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., the Sixth Circuit broke ranks with other courts and held that cost-splitting provisions violate the vindication of rights doctrine when they erode the "deterrent effect" of federal law. 181 The court's preoccupation with the public interest in the enforcement of federal statutes is a direct descendant of the anti-negative externality reasoning in Fox Midwest Theatres.
182
As these decisions suggest, many federal statutes do, in fact, have significant public dimensions; thus, prospective waivers of claims under these laws impose costs on third parties. Antitrust regulation, for example, ensures that markets remain competitive; in turn, because commercial niches are tightly entwined, collusion in one industry very well might spill over and impact another industry. Likewise, securities fraud arguably "reduces investors' confidence in the economy; creates inaccurate pricing signals, facilitating the misallocation of capital; and reduces the efficiency of incentive structures that govern, for example, takeovers and executive compensation."
183 Thus, in these contexts, the statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine can be justified on instrumentalist grounds. In addition, the need to avoid negative externalities explains why some courts have refused to allow defendants to cure onerous arbitration clauses by waiving harsh terms or paying the plaintiff's costs. 184 Suppose Barry and Carla work at Company A, and their employment contracts contain an arbitration clause that requires them to pay a $1000 deposit. Barry sues Company A and proves that he cannot afford the deposit. If a judge strikes down the clause, Company A will reduce or eliminate the deposit requirement.
185
But if a judge simply permits Company A to pay Barry's deposit, Company A's rights-thwarting arbitration clause will remain in effect. In turn, this transaction between Barry and Company A will harm Carla, who will not be able to bring a claim against Company A without overcoming a substantial initial roadblock. Prohibiting these deals between litigants and drafters thus prevents spillover costs.
In other contexts, however, it is not clear that the statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine prevent negative externalities. When courts and scholars speak of the vindication of rights doctrine maintaining "the deterrent functions" of federal laws, 186 they are often protecting other signatories to the same contract (not third parties). Return to the hypothetical situation above with Company A's $1000 arbitral deposit. If this provision means that Barry is less likely to pursue an employment discrimination claim against Company A, then it also means that Susan, a supervisor at Company A, may be more prone to engage in wrongdoing. But to cause a negative externality-to inflict harm on others-the cost-splitting provision would need to make other companies more likely to discriminate. It does not. Companies B, C, and D's incentives to prevent discrimination have nothing to do with Company A's employment contract.
True, if Susan is more likely to discriminate against Barry, then she is more likely to discriminate against Carla. In that sense, the costsplitting provision in Barry's contract does affect non-signatories: his coworkers. But these individuals are often locked into the same costsplitting provision. Recall the argument that one-sided arbitration clauses allow drafters to pay their employees more. 187 Carla is not a passive "third party" with respect to the cost-splitting provision in Barry's contract. She is not like a landowner who gains nothing from the construction of a nearby factory. Instead, she has already reaped the benefits of Barry's cost-splitting provision in the form of higher wages. Like all Company A employees, she internalizes not just the burdens-but also the advantages-of the same mass contract. For this reason, it is not clear that cost-splitting clause causes negative externalities. This slippery issue often surfaces in cases involving class arbitration waivers. 188 Recall that the main objection to these provisions is that they shield the drafter from numerous low-value claims: no consumer will pursue, say, a $5 overcharge claim against a bank unless she can do so on a class basis.
189
As a result, class arbitration waivers eliminate the specter of aggregate liability and allow companies to flout the law.
190
Yet under the law and economics view of adhesion contracts, this selfderegulation permits firms to charge their consumers less and pay their employees more. It may be objectionable for many reasons, but it is difficult to classify as a negative externality.
The briefing in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion illustrates that the defense bar has recognized the mutability of cost-benefit calculation in the context of mass contracting.
191
AT&T laced its class arbitration waiver with bounties for plaintiffs who arbitrated on an individual basis, promising to pay $7500 and double attorneys' fees to any such plaintiff who recovered more than its last written settlement offer. 192 A California district court and the Ninth Circuit invalidated the clause, reasoning that even if it made individual plaintiffs whole, few consumers would sue, and the clause would slash AT&T's liability. 193 In its merits brief at the Supreme Court, AT&T attacked this logic. According to AT&T, the courts below improperly considered the costs that the waiver imposed "on non-parties to the litigation"-the millions of consumers who would never even learn that AT&T had committed wrongdoing without the class action device-rather than focusing narrowly on the Concepcions. 194 But in a spectacular whipsaw, AT&T's amici accused Together, the briefs exploited the feedback loop at the intersection of adhesion contracts and negative externalities: costs imposed on other signatories to the same mass contract are not costs at all; in fact, they are benefits.
In addition to preventing negative externalities, inalienability can also steer owners toward using property in a socially advantageous manner.
Susan Rose-Ackerman cites the nineteenth century Homesteading Acts as an example of this phenomenon. 196 The Homesteading Acts allowed settlers to purchase frontier land at a heavy discount after they had worked it for five years. 197 These statutes forbade settlers from selling their plots during this initial period-a restriction that guaranteed that the land would, in fact, be farmed. 198 Although this mandate removed a stick from the bundle of rights, it also made each bundle more robust: the value of a particular tract increased as each surrounding tract was cultivated. 199 Thus, the Homesteading Acts are examples of "network effects": the phenomenon that certain things become more valuable when they are widely and uniformly used. 200 The classic example of a network effect is a telephone, which is worthless unless many other people also own telephones. 201 In some situations, such as the Homesteading Acts, the state can only reap the positive externality of network benefits if it first restricts property rights. 202 Similarly, prohibiting parties from waiving future public law causes of action generates a positive externality: case law. Precedent is a network benefit-a steady diet of reported opinions makes courts and 2012] ARBITRATION AND INALIENABILITY 759 lawyers more dexterous with legal concepts and fact patterns. 203 Because this information makes it easier for plaintiffs with righteous claims to prevail, it increases the value of those claims. Moreover, precedent allows voters, regulators, and lawmakers to monitor the development of the public laws. For instance, Kevin E. Davis and Helen Hershkoff argue that contract procedure-the alteration of procedural rules by private agreement-reduces governmental transparency. 204 They provide a specific example in the context of provisions that limit discovery:
[A] large body of literature emphasizes the importance of full discovery to judicial decisions in such areas of the law as employment discrimination and consumer protection, in which claims, legal theories, and evidentiary proofs cannot be developed without a rich factual base. Similarly, commentators point to the relevance of tort actions for improving federal agency policymaking by encouraging the disclosure of information. In other words, certain forms of contract procedure may reduce the quality and effectiveness of regulation, a significant potential social cost. 205 Although Davis and Hershkoff limit their discussion to contractual terms that alter procedural rules in court (rather than in arbitration), 206 one might attempt to use their analysis to support a positive externality-based justification for the statutory waiver rule. Without the doctrine, far fewer statutory disputes would reach the courts, shielding Congress's handiwork from the public eye.
Then again, precedent requires litigation, and litigation has a dark side: it soaks up the resources of parties and courts. Rightly or wrongly, our civil justice system has decided that these social costs dwarf the KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60 benefits of precedent. For instance, we strongly encourage settlement, despite the fact that it stunts the flow of judicial decisions. 207 Likewise, the Supreme Court's "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration" 208 reflects a policy determination that the speed and informality of extrajudicial dispute resolution outweigh the virtues of reported opinions. Given this backdrop, it would be anomalous if the main purpose of the statutory waiver rule was to shunt disputes into litigation. These factors may explain why Davis and Hershkoff limit their paper to contractually modified litigation rules in court. 209 Both arbitration and privately tailored court processes distort the signals that voters and lawmakers receive about the substantive law. 210 Yet, as noted above, arbitration also boasts powerful tradeoffs: it reduces the burden on the parties and the judiciary. 211 Conversely, when parties adopt unique procedural principles-but remain in court-they do not tap into those benefits. In fact, by forcing judges to comply with idiosyncratic rules, they likely increase the strain on the court system.
In sum, the need to avoid negative externalities provides some support for the statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine. In other contexts, however, the very parties that these principles purport to protect also benefit from one-sided arbitration clauses, complicating the matter. Accordingly, in the next section, I analyze the federal law of arbitrability through a different rationale for inalienability: non-commodification theory.
C. Non-Commodification
Outside of the domain of economic analysis, scholars have defended inalienability on the ground that it prevents commodification. 212 These diverse perspectives revolve around the same rough idea: sometimes, to permit the sale of a cherished thing would change the thing itself. In this Part, I argue that similar concerns animate the statutory waiver rule and the vindication of rights doctrine. These principles help preserve the distinctive character of public lawmaking in an era where private parties wield legislative-like power. The port of departure for non-commodification theory is Margaret Radin's article, Market-Inalienability. 213 Radin claims that inalienability can help preserve human flourishing. 214 As she notes, even speaking about highly personal objects or attributes in market rhetoric can be damaging. 215 For instance, some economists explain the criminalization of rape as an effort to preserve the "marriage market."
216 Yet, as Radin argues, this language takes a small step toward normalizing rape: it conceives of bodily integrity as detached and fungible-something that can be invaded if the benefits outweigh the costs.
217 This is problematic because of what Radin calls the "domino effect": "once market value enters our discourse, market rhetoric will take over and characterize every interaction in terms of market value." 218 For instance, if prostitution were legal, the open commodification of sex-lurid billboards and cold discussions about the price of intimacy-would alter "our very conception of sexuality and our sexual feelings." 219 Radin thus proposes that things that are closely entwined with personhood should remain inalienable.
220
More importantly for my purposes, scholars have also invoked the non-commodification norm to explain the inalienability of certain civic rights and responsibilities. For instance, the meaning of "citizenship" would change if individuals could pawn off jury duty or compliance with the military draft. 221 Likewise, Cass Sunstein has argued that "core vote buying" (paying people to cast ballots a certain way) would transform 223 Hasen notes that such a scheme would have a tendency to alter the very definition of voting:
The vote, which tens of thousands gave their blood and sweat to secure, is not a commodity that ought to be crassly traded for cash in the political marketplace.
The concern here is that payments for turnout, whether directed to all voters or targeted only at voters in certain areas, brings a money calculation into the picture in much the same way as core vote buying. It tells us that voting might be for getting a discounted ham, and not for choosing the best leaders. 224 Likewise, allowing the pre-dispute sale of federal statutory rights would have a caustic influence on politics. Although money plays a huge role in elections, we shield the actual casting of ballots-the core input of the democratic machinery-from the market. 225 As a result, it makes sense to create a buffer zone around legislation, the primary output of this process. And like Radin's domino effect or Sunstein and Hasen's concern about corrosion, enforcing prospective waivers of federal statutory rights would transform congressional lawmaking into something else. It would allow drafters to prevent public laws from ever taking root. This would change federal statutes into mere default rules: the functional equivalent of private law. In turn, this false parity between the two spheres would cause us to lose sight of public law's unique dimensions.
For one, public law has a pedigree that private law does not. Bicameralism and presentment condition the passage of a statute on approval by both chambers of Congress and the President: representatives who serve diverse constituencies. 226 powerful interest. 227 Moreover, we generally assume that public servants attempt, at least in part, to further their conception of the common good. 228 In stark contrast, drafters of adhesion contracts-powerful interests incarnate-seek to advance their own agendas. As a result, we generally deny private parties the ability to make law. 229 It would be anomalous if we allowed them to un-make law.
To be sure, in other contexts, we encourage private parties to participate in governance. Standard-setting organizations promulgate regulations and companies work in tandem with the state to deliver services under entitlement programs. 230 Law reform projects such as the Uniform Commercial Code or Uniform Trust Code are drafted by lawyers and then presented for legislative approval. 231 Industries such as cattle ranching and diamond selling often create "order without law" through norm-based dispute resolution systems. 232 In these examples, however, the government and private parties share the same goals. Conversely, a drafter who inserts a prospective waiver of statutory rights into a contract has interests that are directly antagonistic to the state. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
Because boilerplate is a kind of contagion, enforcing such a term would cause it to spread, blurring the line between public and private power. In addition, equating public and private law would destroy the expressive function of legislation. Statutes do not just govern citizens. Instead, they "communicate[] social values" and "thereby change behavior." 233 For instance, seatbelt laws and non-smoking ordinances have helped people reconsider even deeply entrenched habits. 234 Likewise, banning insider trading or racial discrimination is a singular way to stigmatize wrongdoing, as "people's views of the acceptability and even morality of those actions change." 235 At the opposite pole, commentators have credited the Americans with Disabilities Act with altering disabled persons' identities by highlighting the contributions they make to the workforce. 236 Allowing federal law to be eclipsed by private agreement would narrow its scope and thus imperil its ability to shape norms. It would also undermine the very idea that public law is expressive by deeming it to be fungible with private law, which we do not think of as expressive.
Finally, enforcing prospective waivers of federal statutory rights would ignore the relationship between regulation and the market. Often, Congress legislates because private ordering has failed to bring about a certain result. Antidiscrimination laws, for instance, remedy the fact that "[t]he labor market, operating freely, had not and would not provide fair employment opportunities for women, racial, ethnic and religious minorities, and older and disabled individuals." 237 239 Because these laws are intended to constrain market participants, 240 it would be perverse to trust the market with these laws. Indeed, there is no reason to think that an after-the-fact market for statutory rights would not suffer from the same infirmities that inspired the regulation in the first instance. Thus, permitting the pre-dispute sale of federal statutory rights would prescribe the disease as cure.
Of course, not all regulation is wise, and private decision-making is often superior to its public counterpart. Moreover, congressionally created rights can be under-enforced or entrusted to unworthy or incompetent plaintiffs. My point is simply that if private parties can erase federal statutes through the mechanism of mass contracting, then federal law ceases to be federal law. It becomes something cheaper: a state-produced version of the same boilerplate that appears in credit card statements, car rental contracts, or end-user license agreements. The statutory waiver rule acts as a gate at the top of this slippery slope. It helps preserve a role for public law in light of the massive rise of private power.
For these reasons, judges should be especially suspicious of arbitration clauses that try to rewrite Congress's handiwork. A rough proxy for this phenomenon should be whether a provision overrides some aspect of a statutory scheme and yet does not serve any arbitrationrelated purpose. Cost-splitting provisions would be an example of a term that is not objectionable under this rubric. Although these clauses alter a background assumption under which Congress legislates-that plaintiffs will be able to pursue statutory claims in the publicly subsidized court system-they are logically related to extrajudicial dispute resolution. After all, someone needs to pay the private judge. But pay-your-ownway and loser-pays clauses are more troubling. Pay-your-own-way provisions override federal statutes that expressly empower successful plaintiffs to recover their attorneys' fees, and loser-pays terms reverse the American rule. At the same time, they are naked attempts to deter claims: they have no relationship whatsoever to the uniqueness of the arbitral forum. Courts should not hesitate to nullify them when they conflict with the congressional blueprint for vindicating statutory rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the beginning of this Article, I introduced Kate, a Title VII claimant, and asked whether a court should enforce her former employer's arbitration clause despite its cost-splitting, loser-pays, payyour-own-way, and anti-class action provisions. Courts currently disagree over how to assess whether these terms thwart a plaintiff's federal statutory rights. I have argued that they can better understand the stakes by conceptualizing the vindication of rights doctrine and its underlying principle, the statutory waiver rule, as a species of inalienability. For one, they should recognize that the efficiency rationale for enforcing adhesive arbitration clauses applies with less force to claims like Kate's, which seek redress for the violation of rights that are incommensurable with money. In addition, they should be particularly suspicious of loser-pays and pay-your-own-way provisions, which-unlike cost-sharing terms-have no relationship to the arbitral process. Allowing drafters to rewrite Congress' handiwork through these terms aggrandizes private parties and undermines the rule of law.
